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For nearly a century, the year 1898 as been regarded as the unmistakable line of 
demarcation for American imperialism. In that year two significant events transpired, each with 
very different origins and outcomes, yet remarkably similar in political underpinnings and 
implications. The Spanish-American War resulted in the acquisition of 119,564 square miles of 
new territory for the United States, with the effective control of an additional 42,426 square 
miles of Cuba in the immediate post-war years.1 As the physical war with Spain was being 
waged in the Caribbean and Pacific, another highly political war was being waged in the U.S. 
Congress over whether or not to annex the Hawaiian Islands. The result of that battle was the 
acquisition of an additional 10,931 square miles of United States territory. In total, by the end of 
1898, the United States had extended its sovereignty over 172,921 square miles of territory 
which it had not held at the beginning of that year. It ranks as the sixth largest instance of 
territorial expansion in the nation’s history, not counting the original thirteen colonies, and was 
the final, lasting extension of United States sovereignty over inhabited areas.2 Was this 
imperialism? Yes. However, it was the end, not the beginning of imperialism by the United 
States. 
Now, at the outset of any discussion, especially one that is bound to include controversy 
and debate, it is essential that there are agreed upon definitions of the terminology to be used. 
This, in and of itself, is a considerable task, for as long as there is more than one human being on 
this planet, there will be more than one view of any given subject. Therefore, my task in this 
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section is not necessarily to win the reader over to the same definitions I will be presenting and 
using. Rather, I will be explaining the methodology and reasoning I employed while formulating 
these definitions, their need, and their limitations.  
It is anticipated there will be objections to these definitions, both from those who will say 
that I am being too restrictive, as well as from those who will say that I concede too much. I hope 
that the efforts which I make to address at least some of these objections are met with kind 
criticism. I would ask that the reader not immediately dismiss the totality of the arguments 
presented should I fail to sufficiently qualify any particular point. It is a concession on my part, 
and one which I believe the historiography supports, that the topic of imperialism is as much 
philosophical as historical, and I make no ridiculous claim to have found a definitive historical 
truth, only to offer a different lens through which we may view the subject. The viability of that 
lens, however, depends upon a clear understanding of its manufacture and employment, so let us 
begin. 
An Indefinable Term? 
Within the realm of scholarly work, the singularly most-often quoted phrase regarding 
the term imperialism is provided by Oxford Professor Sir Keith Hancock: “Imperialism is no 
word for scholars...The emotional echoes which it arouses are too violent and contradictory. It 
does not convey a precise meaning.”3 Despite Dr. Hancock’s warning about the ‘unworthiness’ 
of such a term, many scholars have gone on to write about the subject. Some, such as Paul K. 
MacDonald or Kenneth Pomeranz, would acknowledge the challenge of the vagueness, while 
others, like Robert Zevin, would point more to the, “righteous or offended indignation” 
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generated by employment of the term.4 None of these concerns, however, would stop any of 
these or any other scholar from pressing forward with an analysis of some form regarding the 
topic. I have found in my review of the historiography, that the predominant view which emerges 
is one that seems less concerned with attempting to define imperialism, and more concerned with 
either a) its causes, or b) its forms. One might question, how can such an analysis be achieved or 
be useful without an agreed upon definition? The answer therein lies with the idea that a term 
need not be defined, so long as it may be explained. The field of physics provides us perhaps the 
best possible example of such a rule when it must deal with the idea of gravity, which is a term 
which cannot be defined without relating to its causal properties. As a result, physicists do not 
concern themselves with such a definition, but simply acknowledge that gravity is. 
Much of the same can be said for the study of imperialism to date. So many divergent and 
disputed definitions have found their way into the common vernacular that many authors, 
scholarly and otherwise, have simply moved on from an analysis of what imperialism is, to more 
(seemingly) complex assessments of the how, why, and who concerning the effects of 
‘imperialism.’ Such an abdication of definition generally leaves the authors free to insert their 
own notions of what imperialism is, as needed, to frame their own arguments. Even if an author 
does take the time to present the diverseness in definitions, it is almost always done as a cursory 
measure to highlight the desirability of not going over it.  
None of this is necessarily meant to criticize the authors whose work falls within this 
description. Their work has been, and is, very valuable to our ability to interpret and understand 
history. I only wish to illustrate that the scholarship thus far is incomplete, and will remain so, 
unless we attempt to regain a clearer perception of the subject. Until then, we are like art students 
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arguing over the color of the sky: all agree that it exists “somewhere up there,” but no one is 
willing to say what color it is. If you say, “The sky is blue,” then you will be regarded as a 
simpleton. “It is clearly more teal,” or, “It is a sort of aqua-marine,” some will insist, while the 
poetically inclined will pronounce, “It is black, bejeweled with points of light,” and still others 
will take an existential approach suggesting that, “There is no sky, only color.” When it comes to 
imperialism, it is precisely this sort of dilemma which Joseph M. Siracusa points out in his 
criticism of William Leuchtenburg’s thesis: “As to what actually constituted imperialism, it 
simply could not be shown; for, as in the case of beauty, proof resides solely in the eye of the 
beholder.”5 
Causation as Definition 
Some of the more well-known names on the subject – i.e. Hobson, Lenin, Schumpeter, 
Veblen, etc. – steered clear of constraining definitions for imperialism, if they defined it at all. 
Instead, they developed causation theories of imperialism, and in turn cited evidence of the 
causes as proof of the existence of imperialism. For example, Hobson, Lenin, and Veblen all 
cited economic causes for imperialism, although to greatly varying degrees, and then pointed to 
the existence of those economic circumstances as evidence of the imperialism.6 Hobson and 
Veblen were using a self-identified, widely acknowledged British Empire as their model, and 
could thus utilize the term imperialism with very little explanation since it is a foregone 
conclusion that empires behave imperialistically. It is as much rhetorical trickery as it is anything 
else. To say that imperialism is, “predatory…rooted in economic self-interest,” speaks to 
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personal economic views, but provides very little by which we can measure what those actions 
actually are.7 Even if I were to agree, as Hobson asserts, that imperialism is economically driven, 
and necessarily involves subjugation and exploitation of foreign markets – there are no defined 
actions which I may use as a rubric for identifying when imperialism is taking place and how it 
can be distinguished from the mere exercise of foreign policy.8 
 Sometimes when authors attempt to provide a definition, they will provide one which 
clearly fits their model, yet it will actually end up muddling the issue even more. In analyzing 
Joseph Schumpeter’s, Imperialism and Social Classes, Daniel Kruger notes that Schumpeter 
begins by asserting that, “…’imperialism’ has been so abused as a slogan that it threatens to lose 
all meaning,” and then goes on with his own definition of imperialism as, “the objectless 
disposition on the part of the state to unlimited forcible expansion.”9 Kruger explains that 
Schumpeter is seeking to explain imperialism, as a cause, not rooted in economics, but rather in 
more ancient and basic terms of survival. Framing imperialism as a relic, Schumpeter concluded 
(in 1951) that it is a waning phenomenon.10 Kruger is contrasting Schumpeter’s view of the 
causes for imperialism with that of Hobson and Lenin, showing that Schumpeter, as a capitalism 
apologist, was attempting to provide a definition which absolved capitalist economics from any 
“fault” for imperialist actions.11 Murray Greene would later criticize Schumpeter’s definition as, 
“untenable as a generalized theory” and “an un-historic abstraction.” Greene’s reasoning in 
discrediting Schumpeter is not necessarily the goals or conclusions which Schumpeter reaches, 
but the underlying definition on which Schumpeter offers and predicates his arguments. By 
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referring to imperialist activity as “objectless…expansion for the sake of expansion,” 
Schumpeter is not only asserting that imperialism has no specific cause, but also that when it 
happens, it is always as an exercise of war, exclusively for territorial expansion.12  
 In An Interpretation of American Imperialism, Zevin also shares a skepticism of 
Schumpeter, Hobson, and others regarding their views of the causes (or lack thereof) for 
imperialism. Ziven points out that there is no singular theory which has yet been produced that 
accounts for all empires – especially the ‘American Empire’13 The best example of the 
complexity of the problem which Zevin puts forth is the complication of analyzing civil wars: 
“Were Sherman’s march through Georgia and the Nigerian destruction of Biafra examples of 
imperialism or merely extreme cases of the everyday exercise of sovereign rights by states within 
their own domain?”14 That, however, does not stop Zevin from developing his own definition 
which he uses in his study to test the causation theories developed by Hobson, Schumpeter, and 
others. For Zevin, “…imperialism is activity on the part of any state which establishes or 
subsequently exercises and maintains qualified rights of sovereignty beyond the previous 
boundaries within which such rights were exercised.”15 Here we have our first real attempt by an 
author to make a definitive statement as to what actions he wishes to view as ‘imperialism,’ 
although he acknowledges that it is crafted specifically to test the other theories, and therefore 
may be artificially constraining when it comes to the larger discussion of the subject. In any case, 
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the goal of his study was economic in nature, and still focused on the causes of imperialism, thus, 
he never took his definition further.16 
Definition by Form 
 Writings in which definitions for imperialism abound are those that, rather than trying to 
develop causal theories, instead connect their definitions to the forms which imperialism takes. 
The two most identifiable of these forms are, Cultural Imperialism and Economic Imperialism, 
and their studies tend to focus much more upon the process and effects of imperialism as 
opposed to the actual cause. The first of these, Cultural Imperialism, as a self-contained entity of 
study has just recently become prevalent, as the close of the Cold War and the rise of 
international Islamic terrorism has refocused analysis of powerful nations (mainly the United 
States) and their influence in the rest of the world. While Economic Imperialism, as a form of 
analysis, has been around for much longer, it too is enjoying something of a renaissance – 
especially amongst political and news pundits – who continue to grapple with the complexity and 
rapidity of economic change in the modern world. 
 Both the Cultural and Economic forms tend to lean on a broad definition of empire and 
imperialism, as MacDonald describes it, “…less by overt relations control, but rather by a 
general imbalance in power and influence.”17 It is this definition, in one form or another, which 
has guided the preponderance of imperial studies of at least the past seventy years. It is a very 
useful definition if, rather than seeking to give a definable meaning as to what imperialism is, 
you are more concerned with the effects imperialism produces. In other words, as long as you 
establish and accept the general premise that imperialism is nothing more than a relationship of a 
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‘powerful nation over a weaker one,’ then inserting it into any analysis of international relations 
becomes not only possible, but in some cases, even desirable. It makes the term a generally 
negative rhetorical device which is, as Raymond Aaron puts it, “[a] name given by rivals, or 
spectators, to the diplomacy of a great power”18  
Regarding definitions for imperialism, Anthony Pagden states, “…defining it so widely 
as to include any power runs the risk of rendering the concept indeterminate.”19 Here the 
question is raised, as it was previously, of where, or at what point, ‘imperialism’ is substituted 
for ‘foreign policy’? William Appleman Williams explains in his description what constitutes 
foreign policy: 
Three continuing and interacting processes produce foreign policy. First, the 
domestic and overseas activity of the citizenry, and of the other countries, which 
forces a government to take action in the international area. Second, the nature of 
that official action. And third, the reactions that such policies provoke among its 
own people and on the part of the foreigners who are affected.20 
The authors who argue for Causation and Form definitions tend to favor only the first and 
third portions of this description; setting up what they believe is a complete cause and effect 
model. In doing so, Williams’ second point, the nature of that official action becomes malleable 
and blanketed in an ambiguous term – imperialism. To borrow from the physics analogy: It 
would be like explaining that you let go of a glass and it broke on the floor. This description tells 
you the cause (letting go of the glass) and what the effect was (the breaking of the glass on the 
floor). What it does not explain is what caused the glass to go from your hand to the floor 
(gravity). This may seem an absurd example since we commonly experience gravity; but it does 
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draw attention to the fact that without the contextual explanation of the role gravity played, the 
overall interpretation of the event is left vulnerable to misunderstanding. This is why I tend to 
favor the argument that the second point of Williams’ explanation must be adequately defined if 
we are to understand the nature of the foreign policy in general. As this relates to our discussion, 
all imperialism is foreign policy, but not all foreign policy is imperialism.  
A Quantifiable Definition 
 How then do we go about addressing what Oscar V. Campomanes refers to as, “The 
historic and historiographical conundrum…of recognizing, critiquing, or naming it as 
imperialism”?21 Can we divorce the action from either the cause or the effect to produce a 
definition that is applicable in all, or most, situations? Is there an acceptable definition to be 
found which would enable historians and analysts to review the past and categorically label 
events as imperialistic? If there is, then it is a definition that will inevitably come at the expense 
of those whose work seeks, for whatever reason, a broader interpretation; namely, those whose 
work is more dependent on the definition fitting the proposed hypothesis, rather than the other 
way around. It is into this questionable debate which I will now hazard to put forth my own 
definition of imperialism: 
The extension and exercise of political sovereignty, by any intended action, of one 
sovereign over another, with the intent to retain such sovereignty, once gained. 
While this definition may strike a remarkable resemblance to Ziven’s, I have attached 
two important conditions to mine which I believe Ziven overlooks or purposefully leaves out. 
The first is that, unlike Ziven, I maintain that for the act to be “imperial” in nature, it must be 
intended as such on the part of the state. Not necessarily in origin, but in consequence. The 
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Mexican Cession in 1848 is a prime example of this. The intent of the war was not to gain 
California or the rest of the Southwest; but it was intended to end a border dispute (i.e., the 
extent of sovereignty) between the United States and Mexico. The consequence of that intended 
action resulted in the acquisition of new territory for the United States which was intended to be 
held - thus, imperialism. Which brings up the second distinction, and more poignant in today’s 
world, which is the intent to retain the acquired sovereignty, intact and indefinitely, as a part of 
the aggressor’s sovereignty. 
But Just What Is Sovereignty? 
 As MacDonald states, “…it is often difficult to accurately assess when one state has 
assumed the political sovereignty over another in an imperial manner.” However, in this 
instance, Mac Donald was referring to the difficulty posed in a more ‘form’ oriented approach to 
Cultural or Economic imperialism.22 I would assert that even a brief review of international legal 
traditions does in fact form a clear perception of what constitutes ‘sovereignty.’ Within these 
traditions exist the philosophical and legal reasoning which informed the actions of the modern 
imperial players, including the United States, and which must be understood in order to 
understand the definition I put forth. 
 Much of the work to understand the international conception of sovereignty has been 
thoroughly undertaken by Stephen G. Bragaw in: Thomas Jefferson and the American Indian 
Nations: Native American Sovereignty and the Marshall Court. This work is not only invaluable 
to helping our understanding of international concepts of sovereignty, but also in the application 
of that conception specifically to the United States. Bragaw points out that very early on, the 
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young United States needed to establish a policy to deal with the Native American tribes which 
found themselves within the territorial bounds of the new nation. Much of this “new” policy 
would actually end up being based on older, long-established policies borrowed from colonial 
times and British rule. The British, in turn, had based their treatment of the tribes within the 
treaty system on international norms that went back at least three-hundred years to the fifteenth-
century.23 Much of this international law, jus gentium, had evolved from even earlier Vatican 
canon law which sought to govern the relations between Christian sovereigns, and between 
Christian and “heathen” sovereigns. This law found various incarnations and modifications, most 
notably from Francisco de Vittoria, who for the first time argued that the native inhabitants of a 
land, regardless of their status, had natural rights of sovereignty to that land. John Locke would 
later expand on this idea of right of soil which would lead the English, as well as other European 
powers, to adopt policies which in some form or another allowed for the “extinguishment” of the 
sovereign title held by the natives.24 Let us postpone the question of what gives one sovereign 
the right to extinguish the title of another for a moment to first better understand sovereignty. 
 Pagden states, “Ever since 1648, the modern nation-state has been one in which 
imperium has been regarded as indivisible,” with imperium being synonymous with 
sovereignty.25 Until the American Revolution, sovereignty - both in terms of political and 
military authority - was bound to a single monarch or governing body, such as Parliament; not 
necessarily connected or tied directly to boundary lines. Even though a hierarchical and 
territorial system of governance existed within these systems, there was rarely any dispute over 
the centralized authority, imperium, of the sovereign. Rome, Greece, Persia, Mongolia – all 
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ancient empires prior to the eighteenth-century - bound imperium up in very select governing 
bodies; usually just one person.26  The United States radically altered this conception in 1776 
with its split-sovereignty model, first within the Articles of Confederation, and later in the 
Constitution. For the first time in history, the founding documents and conception of a nation 
acknowledged the existence of multi-leveled and shared sovereignty, and that sovereignty was 
unequivocally connected to defined borders. In fact, much of the language of the Constitution 
concerns itself with the reconciliation of the differences between the sovereign States of the 
Union, even establishing in certain areas the overriding sovereignty of the Federal government, 
acting as the whole. In that sense, one could seemingly contend that the mere existence of the 
United States is a continual and perpetual instance of active imperialism. 
 Now, before I get accused of rhetorical theatrics, I wish to state that the only reason I go 
through all of this is to draw attention to the fact that, with the advent of the United States, a new 
and distinct concept of sovereignty emerged --- one that was not restricted to a monarch and 
disputed territorial boundaries, but instead connected to what would become modern nation-state 
political bodies, constrained by defined territorial borders. This newly codified model of 
sovereignty, however, still needed to contend with Vittoria’s jus gentium, when it came to 
dealing with other sovereigns.27 That means, to address MacDonald’s concern, that in order to 
effectively “extinguish” the sovereignty of another nation, it must either be purchased or 
conquered, establishing the purchasing or conquering sovereignty in its place – i.e., imperialism. 
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Any other arrangement between sovereigns, regardless of the scruples involved, falls outside of 
an ‘imperial’ definition. 
Extinguish: Verb. – Bring to an End; Wipe Out of Existence; Annihilate 
So then, what does history tell us regarding the issue of “extinguishing sovereignty”? In 
general it shows us that the haphazard simplicity provided through warfare is the most often 
utilized method. The conquest of a society inevitably produces, even if it be transitory, an 
extinguishment of the sovereignty which existed prior to the conquest. Does this mean that every 
war which has ever been fought is an instance of imperialism? Under my definition of 
imperialism, the answer is most decidedly, no. Remember, I maintain that in order for there to be 
an act of imperialism, both the initiating action, and the long-term disposition of effect must be 
an intentional extension and exercise of sovereign power. World War II may provide the 
simplest example of a situation where there was never intent, either in joining the war or in its 
conclusion, to retain any conquered territory for the purpose of exercising sovereign authority. 
Once the Axis powers were defeated, after a brief period of subjugated tutelage and rebuilding, 
full sovereignty was returned to the local population and the Allies (mostly) receded to pre-war 
borders. Conversely, take as an example the Mexican-American War, where there was, from the 
outset, a dispute over the sovereign control of territory. Through the course of that war the 
United States conquered vast amounts of territory, and succeeded in displacing the sovereignty 
of Mexico. Since it was the intent of the United States to gain and hold sovereignty over territory 
which it did not have prior to the act of war, it is clearly a case of imperialism. This was despite 




the fact that the U.S. returned most of the conquered territory to the restored sovereignty of 
Mexico.28 
This does not mean that any time a nation wishes to add territory it merely needs to act 
imperialistically and is justified in doing so. Though it certainly happened that way in past 
instances of empire, Vittoria’s arguments, which were heavily influenced by the philosophies of 
Augustine’s just-war theory, made it clear that in the “modern era” there had to be a justifiable 
pretext to the invasion and disposition of a neighboring sovereign. Often this was contingent on 
whether or not the “heathen” sovereign allowed the teaching of the Christian Gospel within his 
land. If he did, then no pretext for imperialism existed, but if not, well, all bets were off. As time 
went on, this reasoning evolved to become more trade/use oriented, leading ultimately to the 
view John Locke would articulate in his Second Treatise on Government and Emmerich Vattel 
would echo in his, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, that essentially said the 
“right of soil” depended not on mere possession, but on effective use.29 In other words, it is not 
enough to assert sovereignty over land; it must also be shown that the land is being put to its 
‘best use’. If the sovereign occupiers of a land were not making the best use of it, then that 
became the justified pretext by which a ‘civilized’ nation could perform an act of imperialism 
and extinguish the sovereign title of the indigenous population – by war and/or by treaty. 
Practical application of this is found in 1783 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris 
ending the Revolutionary War. With the stroke of a pen the sovereign territory of the new United 
States was defined. Although this new boundary incorporated areas which were technically 
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within the bounds of most of the original colonial charters, nothing like meaningful sovereign de 
facto control over western portions of these areas existed. It was the frontier, by all definitions of 
the term. As an additional complication, the question of the sovereign status of the Indian tribes 
within this new territorial boundary was somewhat debatable, since they were not a party to the 
treaty process which ended the war. By the principles of jus gentium this was not seen as 
anything to be concerned about since the United States, by the Treaty of Paris, was the legal 
successor of the “discovering nation.”30 Hence, the legal reasoning at the time suggested that 
whatever previous relationship the Indians had with Great Britain would naturally continue under 
the United States, assuming of course that it was in the best interest of the United States to do so.  
As such, the question lingered for three years until passage of the Indian Ordnance of 
1786. This ordnance primarily affirmed the Articles of Confederation, giving sole sovereignty to 
the national congress to treat with, “…the several nations of the Indians…” It also established 
superintendence, a system continued from the British, setting up northern and southern Indian 
districts in the national domain.31 A year later, the Northwest Ordnance would codify the jus 
gentium principle of “right to soil” by stipulating that:  
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands 
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and, in their 
property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in 
just and lawful wars authorized by Congress.32 
 The importance of this cannot be understated. In one document there is the 
acknowledgement of the sovereign status of the “nations of Indians,” and in the other, the 
express statement that the only permissible method of extinguishing that sovereignty is through 
either war or purchase (via treaty). Thus we can, by applying our definition for imperialism, 
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categorically conclude that every instance of U.S.-Indian relations from July 4, 1776 thru the end 
of the Treaty System in 1871 was in fact, imperialism.33 That is ninety-five years of continual 
acts of imperialism before the “start” of the ‘American Empire’! 
Right or wrong, the philosophical and legal reasoning behind this and all other post-
Columbian instances of imperialism is clearly seen in the context with which the new United 
States formulated its own policies, for both Indian relations and foreign policy in general. It 
would become the ideology known as ‘Manifest Destiney’, through which and in concert with 
the issue of slavery, would define the territorial expansion which occurred during the first 
century of American independence.34 It is a concept which was codified within the Constitution 
as the principle of eminent domain, which acknowledges the government’s right of preemption, 
if it asserts that it will make better use of the land than a private citizen.35 
“When was U.S. Imperialism?”
36
 
 It is thus perfectly reasonable for Campomanes to ask the above question, and to 
continue: “…why the categorical privilege…of ‘1898’ in considerations of its formation?”37 
Unfortunately, Campomanes did not go on to answer this question in any definitive way. He was 
using it merely as a rhetorical illustration of the difficulty presented with discussing ‘American 
Empire,’ and went no more in depth than to suggest that the question is up for grabs - precisely 
because the answer is so dependent upon the definition employed as to what imperialism is. 
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Since the preceding section has remedied such a problem by providing a clear definition, we may 
look for an answer.  
Let us set aside the specifics of 1898 for a moment and move to a more cursory look at 
the behavior of the United States since 1776 to see what events meet our established definition 
for imperialism. For the sake of brevity, Table 1 illustrates some of the more well-known events 
in U.S. territorial expansion or foreign military involvement, and fits them into the broad 
categories of what was and what was not American imperialism. I am not claiming this list to be 
exhaustive in any measure; I will leave it to the reader to evaluate the completeness of this list. 
Given the fact that since July 4, 1776, there have been only twenty-nine years (non-consecutive) 
in which there has been no involvement of the American military in “foreign” lands, it would 
seem an exceedingly wasteful exercise to attempt to cover all events in this paper. 
 
Table 1 
Imperialism Date Not Imperialism Date 
Indian Relations 1871 The Barbary Wars 1805/15 
Louisiana  1803 Civil War 1865 
Florida(s) 1819 The Philippines 1898 
Texas 1845 Cuba  1898  
Oregon 1846 Panama  1903 
Mexican Cession 
(Southwest and California) 
1848 Nicaragua 1933 
Gadsden Purchase 1853 World War I  
World War II 
1918 
1945 
Alaska 1867 Korea 1953 
Hawaii 1898 Viet Nam 1975 
Guam 1898 Grenada 1983 
Puerto Rico 1898 Iraq  
(Gulf War and Liberation) 
1991 
2011 
Samoa 1899 Bosnia 1996 
Virgin Islands 1917 Afghanistan Present 
 *Note – Dates are reflective of the end of official action for a given event. 




 With only a few exceptions between each column, reading from top to bottom, left to 
right is, for all intents and purposes chronologically linear. More to the point, and to reiterate, the 
year 1898 stands out as a bridge between the two columns. Yet, the table also highlights what 
appears to be a paradox. How could the same event, the Spanish-American War, be represented 
in both columns? How can one war be both imperialistic yet not at the same time? This is when 
attention must be brought back to our definition, which has as a requisite the intended retention 
of sovereignty, once gained.  
 It should also be mentioned here that as historians we must confine ourselves to the 
availability of primary sources which we use to draw our conclusions. Speculations about 
conspiracy theories, cover-ups, and ulterior motives make for good fiction novels and box-office 
movie thrillers, but rarely do they find a meaningful place within the field of serious historical 
study. When we look at the intent in the actions of a nation or the actors which bring them about 
in history, we are bound by the records in which they appear. In regard to what follows, I 
welcome anyone who wishes to challenge the “true intent” of the actions of the U.S. government 
or its actors for the events which I cover if they differ from what is presented. I only stipulate 
that any such challenge is brought with accompanying credible evidence. 
The Un-Imperial Empire 
 We have seen how the Mexican-American War provides a clear example of intent for 
territorial expansion in both the justification for military action and in the retention of territory at 
the conclusion of peace. The Spanish-American War then provides us an example where the 
intent for territorial expansion was not there (officially) at the outset of the war, although it 




certainly may have been on the minds of some once hostilities became inevitable.38 Nowhere is 
there in any speeches by President McKinley, nor in any resolutions or declarations of Congress, 
any mention or hint of gaining territory for the United States. In fact, the joint resolution in 
which Congress authorized the President to use force against the Kingdom of Spain in Cuba had 
attached to it the Teller Amendment, which expressly stated that the United States would not 
annex Cuba, once liberated.39 Since we did in fact return sovereignty to Cuba in 1902, under no 
circumstances does our experience with that island fit into our definition for imperialism.40 
 Many argue that the U.S. didn’t really give sovereignty back to Cuba, and point to the 
Platt Amendment as proof. Upon reading the provisions which Senator Platt laid out in 1901, 
there is clearly a question as to whether and to what extent the United States was infringing upon 
the sovereignty that it was in the process of returning to Cuba. It certainly would not be expected 
that any nation would consider itself sovereign if it allows what appears to be unrestricted 
authorization to another sovereign, “to intervene for the preservation of…independence.”41 
However, are the stipulations of the Platt Amendment such a large departure from established 
international norms of the day, or from the forms which post-war relations would take in the 
twentieth-century? For example, Article 1 of the Treaty of San Francisco (formally ending WW 
II) states, “The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan 
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and its territorial waters.”42 While this seems fairly straight forward, Article 3 goes on to 
stipulate that: 
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to 
place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering 
authority, [lists geographical restraints]. Pending the making of such a proposal 
and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all 
and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory 
and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.43 
It would certainly seem that this Treaty (signed by 48 nations) saw no contradiction in the idea 
that, while ‘full sovereignty’ had been returned, a portion of Japan would remain at the 
discretionary control of the United States. Although the U.S. would ultimately choose not to 
exercise this provision, I cite it here as a comparative example. Clearly, by the middle of the 
twentieth-century such a seemingly contradictory concept of sovereignty passed international 
scrutiny. Would it have done so fifty years prior or fifty years later?  
 I will defer an attempt to answer either of those questions to another paper, or another 
author who seeks to take up a more detailed examination of diplomatic histories at the end of the 
nineteenth-century. In the meantime, I will rest my arguments on the foundation that, Platt 
Amendment and all, Cuba was returned to full sovereign status in 1902 when it adopted its own 
constitution. This was a sovereign status which was reaffirmed two years later in a treaty of 
relations signed between the United States and Cuba.44 And given that the next 33 years of 
relations with Cuba were governed by that agreement, none of the actions during that time may 
be cited as separate efforts at imperial action. Thus, with Cuba there was no intent in origin or 
consequence, and obviously there was never intent to retain that which it never sought. Cuba’s 
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place in the non-imperialist column of Table 1 is indisputable. The Philippines, on the other 
hand, may need more explanation. 
 It may be helpful in clarifying the issue of the Philippines if we first understand the 
disposition and categorization of both Guam and Puerto Rico as imperial. As we have illustrated, 
there was no intent to gain territory at the outset of the war. However, in the process of waging 
the war, and as a consequence of the peace treaty with Spain, the United States gained possession 
of both islands. It therefore meets the requisite of intent for the action portion of our definition; 
and since we never stated any intent to, and have not yet, relinquished control over either island, 
it also meets our second requisite of intent to retain sovereign control.  
The Un-Imperial Empire Part II 
 The Philippines presents us with a much more complex situation. The archipelago was 
not officially part of the original war aim; however, it was a long-coveted island group due to its 
location and proximity to the Asian market. Earlier in the 1890’s, U.S. Navy Captain Alfred 
Thayer Mahan aggressively advocated the idea of a stronger Navy to secure our growing 
commercial interests in the Pacific. He and others envisioned a series of coaling stations (for 
ships’ fuel) under U.S. control to help achieve this aim, and thus, he supported the general idea 
of holding overseas colonies.45 However, as Walter LaFeber points out, Mahan was 
conceptualizing the use of colonies much differently than any of his predecessors by, 
“…stressing colonies as strategic bases for a navy and deemphasizing colonies as markets.”46 
This seems very much contrary to causation theorists like Hobson, Veblen, and Lenin. 
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 Even more than ‘imperialism’, the word ‘colony’ seemed to be anathema within the 
American psyche. The idea of a colonial system always harkened public sentiment back to 
Revolutionary days, and the general notion that if the United States were to gain and hold 
colonial possessions, that it would be a “betrayal” of the principles of the republic.47 This seems 
especially odd, considering the fact that all of westward expansion, from the time of the 
Louisiana Purchase through the Gadsden Purchase – even Alaska – was, for all intents and 
purposes, colonialism. Couching such expansion in the phraseology of ‘territory’ instead of 
‘colony.’ seems to have the effect of absolving all opposition to the practice. 
 This is certainly not to say that territorial expansion had not been free from vigorous 
debate until the Spanish-American War. Nearly every instance of territorial expansion 
precipitated its own unique “constitutional crisis” from the Louisiana Purchase onward. Even 
before 1803, during the formative years of the nation, the question of how to deal with ‘national 
domain’ sparked heated, sharply divided debate. The Constitution does speak plainly about the 
fact that there may be territories, and that the Federal government is the administrator of those 
territories, but it is completely silent on how those territories come into existence. This generated 
much debate early on.48 Even after many of those problems had been resolved in the process of 
adding Louisiana, many more issues – slavery, land usage, Indian relations, etc. – would keep the 
debate alive.  
 By the time of the Spanish-American War, the argument had shifted to questions of 
“fitness” for statehood. Senator George Vest of Missouri argued that he, “…did not deny or 
question the power of Congress to acquire new territory, but that it must be held afterwards with 
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the purpose of making it into States.”49 In debating the question of whether or not to annex the 
Philippines, Vest asserted that to do so would place the island chain on an inevitable path toward 
statehood. However, Representative Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts disagreed with Vest 
and declared, “The Power of the United States in any territory or possession outside the limits of 
the states themselves is absolute.”50 Lodge maintained that statehood was far from inevitable, 
and that Congress had the ultimate power to decide the fate of any territory. Each side of the 
debate furnished numerous Supreme Court decisions to bolster their respective arguments. In the 
end, the perceived legality of whether or not the U.S. would take the Philippines took a back seat 
to the “more tangible” questions of national interest, political calculation, and public opinion of 
whether or not we should.  
 Passionate imperialists, like Senator Albert Beveridge of Indiana, lent a very strong voice 
to this discussion with memorable speeches such as, “March of the Flag.”51 He also undertook a 
fact-finding tour to Asia, which included stops not only in the Philippines, but also in Japan, 
where he met with Prime Minister Ito. In the course of their discussion, the Prime Minister 
explained to Beveridge, regarding the Philippines:  
[Ito] First, you must keep them.  
[Beveridge] I asked him why? 
[Ito] Because your national honor is involved; because it is to your interest, not at 
once, but greatly, almost incontestably so in the future; and because if you do not, 
another Power will immediately take them, involving the world in war in all 
probability, for which you will be responsible.52 
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It would seem that such reasoning made its way back to President McKinley. Beveridge did meet 
with McKinley upon his return to Washington, and it is likely that he would have shared the 
Prime Minister’s thoughts with the President; but just how much that influenced McKinley’s 
decision is not known. The best surviving record that we have which gives us insight to the 
President’s reasoning is an interview which took place in November of 1899, but did not appear 
in print until January of 1903 in the Christian Advocate: 
And one night late it came to me this way—I don’t know how it was, but it came: 
(1) That we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and 
dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France and Germany—our 
commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; 
(3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-
government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse 
than Spain’s was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them 
all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them…53 
So it would seem then that Table 1 is in error, and that the Philippines more properly belong in 
the category of imperialism. The intent of action portion is met, just as it was for Puerto Rico and 
Guam, and here we have the President stating what appears to be a clear intent to keep the 
archipelago indefinitely. Yet, appearances can be deceiving. I will concede that the first portion 
of our definition is met; no question. However, I cannot totally subscribe to the intent to keep the 
islands as being fulfilled.  
 In the first place, the United States never fully conquered the islands of the Philippines. 
The orders which Commodore Dewey acted under were not explicit in terms of gaining and 
holding any ground – or even of capturing Manila itself:  
Dewey, Asiatic Squadron: War has commenced between the United States and 
Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, 
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particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use 
utmost endeavors. Long. (Secretary of the Navy)54 
The only specific goal in this instance was to prevent the Spanish fleet anchored in Manila Bay 
from becoming a threat to the west coast of the United States. The fact that it ended as such a 
decisive naval victory actually resulted in some later speculation (fueled in part by Dewey 
himself) that the Spanish actually surrendered before the “battle,” and that the only shots fired 
were to save the honor of the Spanish governor.55 In any case, while the United States Navy 
annihilated the Spanish fleet, it was the Filipino freedom fighters under Emilio Aguinaldo who 
successfully subdued the remaining Spanish forces on Luzon, which led to the islands being 
offered in the treaty negotiations at the end of the war. Unfortunately, it was also true that it was 
the Filipinos who had conquered the islands themselves which led to Filipino insurrection and 
resistance once the U.S. decided not to leave immediately. 
 The aforesaid leads to the second point: although there was nothing as stark as the Teller 
Amendment governing the disposition of the Philippines immediately following the war, there 
was also nothing as official as annexation. This is a misunderstood fact which creeps into 
histories about the Philippines, They were not annexed – they were ceded, for $20 million 
dollars, as a part of the treaty ending the war.56 This is what allowed the fire stoking the debate 
over colonies to grow, and as such, left the issue of disposition of the Philippines open. To put it 
plainly, Guam and Puerto Rico were simply too small and insignificant, both in square miles of 
land and in population, for the American public to care. The Philippines, however, was 
composed of 10 million people who were about to be brought, in some manner, into the 
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American fold. This was highly controversial, and the permanency of the Philippines as a U.S. 
possession was far from decided. 
 Articles which appeared in popular magazines at the time, like Cosmopolitan, published 
statements such as, “Nobody will pretend that…the Philippines are designed to become a state.” 
Or in Century magazine, where the author stated, “In no circumstances likely to exist within a 
century should they [the Philippines] be admitted as a State of the Union…” These articles, 
ironically one arguing in favor of keeping the islands, the other against, show that the reasoning 
on both sides was remarkably similar. The philanthropically-minded imperialist and the 
xenophobic anti-imperialist both relied on essentially racist and nearly identical arguments to 
justify their particular stance.57 Even the women’s suffrage movement jumped into the debate 
which threatened to splinter their cause. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony took 
opposing sides over the war, Stanton being in favor and Anthony opposing. 58 
 These debates would continue throughout the next several years, but would taper off once 
the anti-American insurrection led by Aguinaldo had been successfully quelled in 1901. From 
that time forward the only official concern was setting up a stable provisional government which 
would lead the way forward. For this task McKinley had already tapped Federal Circuit Court 
Judge and former Solicitor General William Howard Taft, who served as provisional governor.59 
During this time the debate over independence for the Philippines remained active within 
political circles, but had largely died out in the mainstream American thought process. 
Meanwhile,  the island group slowly made progress toward becoming a self-governing state – 
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but did so outside of the regular territorial process, as outlined in the Northwest Ordnance and 
Organic Acts, that took place in all other past instances of territorial expansion. Fifteen years 
after the end of fighting and the establishment of a provisional government, the Jones Act passed 
in 1916 promised independence for the archipelago. Although it would take another thirty years 
to realize – the delay in no small part due to the Great Depression in the United States, World 
War I, and further complications as a result of four years of occupation by the Japanese during 
World War II – independence did come. On July 4, 1946, full sovereignty was returned to 
Republic of the Philippines.60 Thus, the Philippines is placed outside of our definition for 
imperialism. 
Hawaii? 
 The remaining significant 1898 event is the annexation of Hawaii. I do not feel it 
necessary to belabor the how’s and why’s of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. I have 
already placed their entry into the domain of the United States squarely within the imperial 
column. However, it is important to note that discussions within the media of the day as well as 
within the political sphere were laced with the same general arguments and concerns as with the 
Philippines.61 There were in fact very few instances where Hawaii and the Philippines were 
discussed or debated separately, especially in light of the fact that for many the end of the actual 
fighting during the Spanish-American War was simply a formality. News of Dewey’s capture of 
Manila had already reached the mainland by summer, and many were already making business 
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plans for “the new colony.”62 Of course, many of these “business plans” amounted to little more 
than political rhetoric, since the actual disposition of either island chain had yet to be decided. 
 The distinctive feature of Hawaii in this discussion is its retention as a territory and 
eventual state. I am still perplexed at how or why two Pacific Island chains, both entering the 
control of the United States during the same year, harboring many topographical and 
environmental similarities, would take such vastly divergent paths. The only plausible 
explanation that is offered is, much in support of the causation theorists, economic. The number 
of existing American business interests at the time, coupled with the events of the Spanish-
American War (and a generally pro-expansionist President), and a minority indigenous 
population, gave the Hawaiian annexation movement its final successful nudge.63 
Conclusion 
 Imperialism has sometimes been defined as, “…the policy and practice of forming and 
maintaining an empire…”64 In this sense, and by my own definition, there is no doubt that the 
United States is an empire. From the Indian Ordnance of 1786, through to the annexation of the 
Hawaiian Islands in 1898, the United States engaged in an active, imperialistic, expansion of its 
national sovereignty. Many came to believe that the rapidity with which the nation expanded was 
the work of a divine hand; that it was the “manifest destiny” of the nation “to overspread the 
continent.”65 It would also become a signature feature for some, like Frederick Jackson Turner, 
who saw the defining characteristics of America in the dynamism of the frontier process – which 
depended upon expansion to provide a frontier. Turner himself even mused in 1896 whether or 
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not the conquering of the continent, “…might mean a drastic assertion of national government 
and imperial expansion under a popular hero.”66  
 It becomes extremely difficult to argue that the events of 1898, the ascendancy of 
Theodore Roosevelt to the U.S. presidency, and the brief flirtation with colonialism in that era do 
not meet Turner’s prediction. However, it also should be clear at this point that following 1898, 
Americans decidedly turned their backs on the idea of any further imperial actions. If we define 
imperialism as: the extension and exercise of political sovereignty, by any intended action, of 
one sovereign over another, with the intent to retain such sovereignty, once gained - then only 
once following the Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish-American War, did the United States 
permanently extend its sovereignty over an inhabited area, the Virgin Islands in 1917.67 How 
then can these events, and the date 1898, stand as the “start” of ‘American Imperialism’? 
 Clearly, the twentieth-century, and so far the beginning of the twenty-first-century, have 
presented us with a plethora of new international relations and dynamics. How countries conduct 
foreign policy, how alliances and treaties are negotiated and interpreted, and how inevitable 
conflicts involving questions of sovereignty get resolved, all provide fertile ground for analysts 
and experts to probe. There is considerable nuance to be found within each of these questions 
which must not get lost or overlooked by improperly – and quite frankly, lazily – lumping it all 
under the term imperialism.  
 Have we helped the discussion? Has the definition which we have employed here 
equipped us to better understand the events of today, and label them as “imperialism”? Perhaps - 
you see, my goal, as I laid out at the beginning of this paper, was to find a definition which 
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would enable historians to look at the past and identify imperialism. It is of no use when 
attempting to analyze events as they unfold, simply because so much of the definition is 
contingent upon the long-term disposition of any imperial-like endeavor. As we saw, it took over 
forty years to settle whether or not the Philippines were to be an imperial prize or independent.  
What we do know is that our definition is applicable throughout the histories of empires, 
both ancient and recent. Moving forward, historians will have at their disposal an uncontestable 
rubric by which they may approach imperial studies. This will also encourage, as suggested 
above, other disciplines which look at historical events, to sharpen their own definitions and 
explanations of causation and effects. The historians will again own their subject, telling the 
economist, the social-behaviorist, the fill-in-the-blank outside expert, “No, you cannot redefine 
history to fit your model any longer.” 
The United States is an empire. It made itself one by practicing unceasing imperialism for 
the first one-hundred and twenty-two years of its existence. It will remain an empire until the 
dissolution of the Union. However, to continue to argue that the year 1898 marks the beginning 
of this empire is to be willfully blind to the events of earlier history. The ‘American Empire’ did 
not begin in 1898, nor did this empire end in 1898. What the year 1898 did mark, 
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